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External Surveillance of Irish Fiscal Policy During the Boom1 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The current international financial crisis, greatly amplified by the collapse of a domestic 
property bubble and construction boom, has caused enormous damage to Ireland’s public 
finances. Between 2007 and 2009, the general government balance moved from small 
surplus to a deficit amounting to 14.3% of GDP, while the ratio of gross government debt 
to GDP rose from 25% to 64%.  
 
This deterioration is quite the sharpest experienced by any EU member state, as Chart 1 
makes clear. Notably, the deteriorations registered by Greece, Portugal and Spain have 
been less pronounced. Likewise, there are few historical precedents for what has been 
experienced in Ireland. In an EU context, the only comparable episode is what happened 
in Finland in the early 1990s. There, the budget balance swung from a 6.9% of GDP 
surplus to an 8.3% of GDP deficit between 1989 and 1993, while the debt/GDP ratio 
increased by 41% points. 
 
The deterioration in Ireland’s public finances has occurred in the context of an 
exceptionally large contraction in output and employment. Real GDP, having increased at 
an average rate of 7.3% per annum over the previous fourteen years, is estimated to have 
fallen by 10% cumulatively on a calendar year basis between 2007 and 2009 (the fall in 
GNP, a more meaningful measure of income in Ireland’s case, is estimated to have been 
somewhat steeper at 14%) while employment is estimated to have shrunk by 9%. The 
only contraction of comparable severity to have occurred in a developed economy in the 
post-war era is, again, that recorded by Finland in the early 1990s.  
 
In investigating the reasons for the abrupt collapse in Ireland’s public finances, analysts 
have been more or less harshly critical of the conduct of Irish fiscal policy during the 
boom that preceded the crisis. Of particular interest are the verdicts pronounced by 
organisations whose role includes the surveillance of Irish policy. The IMF is one such 
agency. In its 2009 Article IV report on Ireland, it had this to say: 
 
   “ Well before the crisis hit, public finances had developed serious structural 
weaknesses. The facts are well known. In the boom years, personal income tax rates were 
lowered and expenditure grew rapidly (at about the highest pace amongst OECD 
economies). Buoyant property-related revenues (stamp duties, VAT and capital taxes 
masked the growing structural deficit which reached 12.5% of GDP in 2008.” 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Dublin Economics Workshop Annual Policy 
Conference in Kenmare in October 2009 and subsequently at seminars in the Department of Economics, 
Finance and Accounting at NUI-Maynooth and the Department of Economics at NUI-Galway. I would like 
to thank participants at those seminars for useful comments and suggestions. 
 
“Various commentators and the IMF in its Article IV consultations 
did warn that the seemingly unstoppable growth masked serious imbalances, including 
the fragility of public finances.” 
 
This conveys the impression that the IMF foresaw the crisis and warned about it, but it 
begs a number of questions. Did the IMF foresee the crisis? Did it warn about it and, if so, 
how explicit were those warnings? Did it advise the government on how a crisis might be 
averted and, if so, did the government ignore that advice? Of course, the IMF is not the 
only external agency that is charged with the responsibility for carrying out surveillance 
of Irish fiscal policy. The EC and the OECD are also active in this field. Similar 
questions can be asked of them. 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to answer these questions with a view to assessing 
the quality of external surveillance of Irish fiscal policy during the boom years. The paper 
is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the conduct of fiscal 
policy and the evolution of the public finances in the 2001-2007 period. In Section 3 we 
ascertain what, with the benefit of hindsight, the principal errors made in the conduct of 
fiscal policy during this period were. In Sections 4 to 6 we examine the record of the IMF, 
the EC and the OECD respectively in relation to the surveillance of Irish fiscal policy 
between 2001 and 2007, by reviewing the reports on the Irish economy and public 
finances published by these agencies. In Section 7 we highlight some of the weaknesses 
that characterised the surveillance effort, paying particular attention to deficiencies of 
methodology. Section 8 summarises and sets out some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The conduct of fiscal policy: 2001-2007 
 
On the face of it, the conduct of fiscal policy in Ireland in the two decades prior to the 
onset of the current crisis was exemplary. Having run very large double-digit budget 
deficits during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, racking up a huge debt which had 
grown to 113% of GDP by 1987, Ireland staged a remarkably successful fiscal 
consolidation in the late 1980s. By 1989 the deficit had dropped below 3% of GDP, never 
to breach this level again until 2008, and the debt ratio had fallen below 100%, a prelude 
to it falling a good deal further. 
 
By 1997, the Irish government was running a budget surplus and that outcome was 
repeated in all but one of the next ten years. Over the 1997-2007 period the budget 
surplus averaged 1.7% of GDP and the debt-GDP ratio fell from 74% to 25%. In the five 
years prior to the onset of the current crisis the average budget surplus was somewhat less 
than this at 1.3% of GDP. 
 
It is worth making the point that while Ireland was not unique amongst EU member states 
in the consistency with which it ran budget surpluses between 1997 and 2007 (Finland 
and Luxembourg also achieved surpluses in 10 out of 11 of these years, Denmark in nine, 
Sweden in eight), it was well ahead of the norm in this regard. Several member states - 
France, Italy, Austria and Portugal amongst them – failed to register a single budget 
surplus in this period, and the aggregate position of the EU as a whole is that a surplus 
was recorded in only one year (2000).  
 
By the same token, Ireland’s performance looks very impressive when evaluated with 
reference to its debt/GDP ratio which fell by 49% points between 1997 and 2007, a 
bigger decline than that recorded by any other EU member over the period, and one 
which took the Irish ratio to a lower level than that of any other EU15 country except 
Luxembourg. 
 
Of course, this impressive evolution of Ireland’s public finances occurred against a 
highly supportive economic background. Rapid growth in output and employment 
imparted a powerful boost to tax revenues, depressed cyclical expenditures and greatly 
increased the denominator in the fiscal ratios. The issue that recent bitter experience 
raises about all of this is, of course, the issue of the sustainability of the output and 
employment gains that were taking place. In this connection, it is worth distinguishing 
between two phases of the long Irish boom. 
 
These phases are roughly divided by the millennium year. In the period leading up to that 
year, a substantial real exchange rate depreciation (see Chart 2) helped to generate 
exceptionally rapid export growth, while relatively high real interest rates (see Chart 3) 
are likely to have exerted some dampening effect on the property market and construction 
activity. In the subsequent period, quite the reverse pattern obtained: near-zero real 
interest rates stimulated credit growth, housing demand and residential construction, 
while a sharp real exchange rate appreciation slowed the pace of exporting activity2.  
 
The result, in a nutshell, was that the economy shifted from an export-led growth 
dynamic to one that leaned heavily on domestic demand, construction investment in 
particular. This is evident in the changing pattern of employment growth. In the 1994-
2000 period, of the net increase in total non-agricultural employment of 467,000 some 
74,000 or 16% was accounted for by construction and a further 72,000 (15%) by the 
public service. In contrast, of the net employment increase of 440,000 recorded between 
2000 and 2007, 26% (114,000) and 34% (148,000) were accounted for by construction 
and the public service respectively. 
 
Not only was the rate of increase recorded by construction in the latter period 
unsustainable, but the levels achieved were not sustainable and were liable to unravel. By 
2007 those at work in construction represented almost 14% of the total workforce (up 
from 10% in 2000 and 7.5% in 1993). The equivalent proportions in other advanced 
economies in 2007 were in the range 5-7%. In 2006, the construction industry produced 
93,000 residential units. This compared with estimates of 60-65,000 for underlying 
demand on the assumption of zero net outward migration3. Indeed, not only in 2006, but 
                                                 
2 For good discussions of the role of credit growth in the pre-crisis years, see Kelly (2009), Connor et al 
(2010) 
3 See for example the ESRI Medium-Term Review 2005-2012 
also in each of the years 2003 to 2005, and again in 2007, did the number of residential 
units completed exceed this estimate of underlying demand. 
 
 - Current expenditure 
 
If the year 2000 represented a watershed in the transition of the economy from export-led 
growth to construction boom, it also marked something of a regime change in terms of 
the management of the public finances, and of public spending in particular. In each of 
the years 1993 through 2000 the rate of growth of government current spending was 
below (and in some years very considerably below) the growth rate of nominal GDP, as 
Chart 4 illustrates. For most of this period indeed, current spending growth was subject to 
an explicit limit4. The result was that the ratio of current spending to GDP fell steadily 
and, on a cumulative basis, substantially, from 33.4% in 1993 to 24.6% in 2000. No such 
restraint is evident in subsequent years. The explicit cap on spending growth was 
abandoned in 2001 and, in each of the years 2001 through 2007 current spending 
increased at a faster rate (and in some years at a much faster rate) than nominal GDP. By 
2007, the ratio of spending to GDP was back above 30%. 
 
So, the first feature that all the budgets of the 2001-2007 period have in common is 
disproportionately rapid current spending growth. Another, related, feature that is 
common to six out of seven of these budgets (2006 is the exception) is that an already 
generous initial spending allocation was exceeded. In some years the margin of overshoot 
was very large. 2001 is a particularly egregious example: in that year, current spending 
increased by just under 20%, almost 5% points faster than had been budgeted for.  
 
- Tax revenue 
 
There is a widespread perception that the period from 2000 to 2007 was one during 
which taxes were greatly reduced in Ireland. Actually, this is not the case. It is true that 
some taxes were reduced, but the overall tax burden remained unchanged. What defines 
the period rather better is the big shifts that occurred in the composition of tax revenue 
and the extent to which the income tax base shrank. 
 
Measured as a fraction of GDP, the tax burden (including social security contributions 
etc.) was the same in 2007 as it had been in 2000, at 30%. This, despite the fact that most 
(though not all) of the budgets introduced in the intervening years contained packages of 
tax reducing measures. Far and away the most generous was the 2001 budget which 
implemented a package of tax cuts equivalent to 1.4% of GDP. This was followed by two 
budgets in which taxes were raised: by the equivalent of 0.5% of GDP and 0.7% of GDP 
respectively. In fact, it was 2005 before another tax-cutting package was announced. The 
                                                 
4 The government in power from December 1994 to June 1997 adopted a limit of x% per annum growth in 
an aggregate called Gross Current Supply Services Spending (the aggregate to which Chart 4 relates), 
which excludes debt service costs and is gross of PRSI receipts, Health Contribution receipts and other 
appropriations-in-aid. The government that assumed power in mid-1997 adopted a limit of 4% growth on 
an annual average basis over its term of office in respect of net current expenditure, an aggregate that 
includes debt service and is net of PRSI receipts etc. The budget of 2001 explicitly signalled the 
abandonment of this limit. 
budget of that year reduced taxes by the equivalent of 0.4% of GDP; the budget of 2006 
did likewise, while the 2007 budget cut taxes by a net 0.6% of GDP.  
 
An important feature of the period is the extent to which overall tax receipts diverged 
from budget. In 2001, 2002 and 2007, revenue ended up well below target, but in each of 
the years 2003 through 2006, receipts overshot target by large amounts. In 2006, for 
example, tax receipts exceeded what had been projected at budget time by €3.6bn or 9%. 
The forecasting errors were concentrated in those tax categories that are sensitive to 
activity levels in property and construction. Thus, of the cumulative overshoot of €9bn in 
the 2003-06 period, €6bn was accounted for by capital taxes and stamp duties, and a 
further €2bn by VAT which benefited from unexpected buoyancy in new home sales. 
 
The strong influence of property transactions and construction activity is also evident in 
the changing composition of tax receipts (see Chart 5). In the early 1990s, the share of 
capital taxes and stamp duties in total tax revenue fluctuated in the range 3-4%. By 2000, 
it had reached 8%, although it fell back to 6.6% in 2002 in response to the economic 
slowdown of 2001-02. In the next few years it rose rapidly and peaked at close to 16% in 
2006. Just as there was a more or less secular increase in the share of capital taxes and 
stamp duties in total revenue from the mid-1990s, so there was a secular decline in the 
share of income tax in the total. It fell by about 10% points over this period. This fall was 
partly the outcome of a policy of reducing effective rates of income tax. 
 
Table 1 provides key information on the income tax reductions implemented in the 
budgets of 2001 through 2007. In each case, the table identifies the total cost in terms of 
revenue foregone of the package of income tax measures, how this total compares with 
the cost of indexing the income tax system to the CPI, and how the total breaks down 
between its principal constituent parts. The main points to notes are as follows: 
 
 In 5 out of 7 years, the cost of the package greatly exceeded the cost of indexation.  
 A relatively small amount of resources was directed at cutting income tax rates. 
Indeed, none of the budgets of 2002 through 2006 implemented rate cuts. 
 Rather more than half the €5.3bn of tax relief given over the period 2001-07 was 
absorbed by increasing the value of tax credits. 
 
This last point is of critical importance since increasing tax credits effectively takes 
income earners out of the tax net altogether and thereby reduces the tax base. Between 
2000 and 2007 the proportion of income earners legitimately not paying any income tax 
increased from 28% to 40%. 
 
- The budget balance and the fiscal stance 
 
As mentioned already, in six of the seven years prior to the onset of the current financial 
crisis, the Irish government recorded a budget surplus. The exception was 2002 when a 
deficit amounting to 0.4% of GDP was registered, the first deficit since 1996. 
  
In four of the other years (2003 through 2006), a surplus was achieved despite the initial 
target being a deficit. Mostly this was because the margin of overshoot on the revenue 
side outweighed the margin of overspending. In 2006 the happy coincidence of a very big 
tax overshoot and a small spending undershoot conspired to produce a budget surplus of 
2.9% of GDP in place of the 0.6% of GDP deficit that had been originally targeted. This 
was exceptional however. It was more often the case that some portion of the unexpected 
revenue buoyancy was used to finance higher than budgeted spending. In 2007, a 
spending overshoot combined with a tax undershoot to produce a much smaller budget 
surplus than had been targeted. 
 
What was the fiscal stance during the period under review? We can infer the intended 
stance of policy from estimates of the cyclically adjusted budget balance contained in the 
Stability Programme Update published by the Department of Finance at budget time each 
year since 2001. These estimates are set out in Table 2.. They suggest that the ex ante 
policy stance was expansionary in 2001, contractionary in each of the years 2002 through 
2004, and expansionary again in each of the next three years. This points to a curious, if 
not perverse pattern, because in each of the years in which fiscal policy was intended to 
have a contractionary effect, according to this measure, the Department of Finance was 
forecasting that the economy would grow at a rate below prevailing estimates of its 
potential growth rate, and in each of the years in which the intended policy stance was 
expansionary, especially 2001, GDP growth was forecast to exceed potential. 
 
Having said that, it is worth pointing out that the Department of Finance has, for a long 
time, been openly sceptical about the usefulness of estimates of the potential growth rate 
and the cyclically adjusted budget balance for Ireland. The text accompanying such 
estimates as it is constrained to publish under the auspices of successive Stability 
Programme Updates betrays this scepticism5.  
 
 
3. Policy errors 
 
Why did Ireland’s public finances deteriorate so sharply during the recent crisis? Table 3 
identifies the main proximate reason: a collapse in revenue. Total current receipts 
dropped by 13% in 2008 and by a further 19% the following year, for a two-year 
cumulative decline of 29%. The decline in tax receipts proper over this period was only a 
little less at 25.3%. In the meantime, current spending continued to rise at a brisk pace, at 
an annual average rate of 5% in nominal terms (and at a slightly faster rate in real terms).  
 
The collapse in revenues took place against the background of a steep downturn in 
economic activity. Even so the decline in taxes greatly exceeded the 14% contraction of 
nominal GDP between 2007 and 2009, implying a large ex post elasticity of about 1.8. 
Given that the 2009 tax take was boosted by a range of revenue-raising measures, the ex 
ante elasticity would have been appreciably higher than this.  
 
                                                 
5 An appendix to the Stability Programme Update of December 2000 sets out in detail the Department’s 
reservations about the use of this methodology. Subsequent Updates reiterate these reservations. 
This suggest that the factors behind the revenue collapse may be divided in two: (i) those 
that caused the extraordinarily steep fall in nominal GDP and, (ii) those that caused the 
remarkably high sensitivity of tax receipts to economic activity.  
 
In fact the two sets of factors overlap to an important degree, with the collapse in house-
building activity and the property market responsible for most of the fall in GDP in 2008 
and 2009 and also for the disproportionality of the tax revenue response. It is no surprise 
that exactly the same tax heads that exhibited such remarkable buoyancy during the boom 
years were those that saw the steepest reversal between 2007 and 2009. Thus receipts 
from capital taxes and stamp duties, which had grown by 45% and 34% per annum 
respectively between 2002 and 2006, fell by 52% and 46% on an annual average basis 
between 2007 and 2009. 
 
Viewed from this perspective, the overarching error of fiscal policy in the boom years 
was the failure to anticipate the reversal of the tax revenue surge that occurred during this 
period. To safeguard against this reversal, much bigger budget surpluses than were 
recorded would have been required. Instead, the government used large transitory tax 
receipts to fund the rapid growth of permanent spending commitments and the narrowing 
of the tax base. Another policy error, arguably of a lower order of gravity, was the 
inappropriately pro-cyclical fiscal stance from year to year6.  
 
These policy errors stand out starkly when viewed from the wreckage of today. But, how 
reasonable a test is that? How evident were these errors in real time? There are several 
individual commentators who can validly claim that they pointed out the errors as they 
were being made, and drew attention to the risks created by committing them, although 
not even the most pessimistic of these came close to forecasting the scale of the 
deterioration in the public finances7. However, in terms of exerting influence on decision 
makers, it is not individual analysts that matter so much as those agencies, especially 
international agencies, whose function it is to carry out policy surveillance, and whose 
stature and influence is such that decision makers are likely to listen carefully to what 
they have to say. It is to a review of such surveillance efforts that we now turn. 
 
 
4. Policy surveillance: the EU 
 
 - Policy instruments and the surveillance cycle   
 
Surveillance of fiscal policy by EU institutions takes place under the auspices of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which is essentially an agreement amongst euro zone 
                                                 
6 Year-to-year changes in the overall fiscal stance per se, however inappropriate they may have been, did 
not play much (if any) causal role in the deterioration of the public finances between 2007 and 2009, or in 
the severely constrained position in which the Irish government found itself when the crisis struck. What 
would have mitigated the former was less reliance on property-related sources of revenue during the boom; 
what would have mitigated the latter was larger surpluses on average over the boom years.  
7 A good example is Davy Stockbrokers (2006) which warned that the budget deficit might approach the 
Maastricht 3% of GDP limit in the event that there was a severe correction in the property market. 
member states to manage their public finances within certain parameters, the key 
objective being the avoidance of excessive deficits. 
 
The SGP provides for the deployment of a small range of policy instruments under its 
‘preventive’ and ‘dissuasive’ arms respectively. The ‘preventive’ arm is concerned with 
averting excessive deficits. To this end, one of two instruments may be directed at a 
member state: 
 
 an early warning, from the ECOFIN Council on the basis of a proposal from the 
Commission, that the member state in question is straying from the path necessary to 
prevent an excessive deficit from occurring, accompanied by a recommendation that 
adjustments be made in order to return to that path; 
 formal policy advice from the Commission which allows the Commission to directly 
address a member state about the implications of its fiscal policies for long-term 
sustainability of its public finances8. 
 
The ‘dissuasive’ arm, on the other hand, is concerned with the situation that arises when a 
deficit breaches the 3% of GDP threshold. Such a breach triggers the excessive deficit 
procedure, under which, if a deficit is determined to be excessive within the meaning of 
the Treaty, the ECOFIN Council issues recommendations to the member state concerned 
to eliminate the excessive deficit within a specified timeframe.   
 
The EU surveillance cycle unfolds as follows:  
 
 the ECOFIN Council promulgates a set of broad economic policy guidelines (BEPG), 
the purpose of which is to improve the co-ordination of economic policy across 
member states and facilitate the smooth functioning of economic and monetary union. 
Promulgation of the BEPG used to be annual but now occurs at three-yearly intervals; 
 member state governments update their Stability Programmes which are medium-
term plans for maintaining stability of their respective public finances and avoiding 
(or eliminating) excessive deficits; 
 Commission staff assess the respective Stability Programmes from the point of view 
of ensuring their compatibility with the objective of avoiding excessive deficits (or 
eliminating an excessive deficit if one exists) and also from the point of view of 
ensuring compatibility with the BEPG. This assessment may prompt the Commission 
to tender formal policy advice directly to a member state or to recommend to the 
Council that an early warning be issued; 
 Having received the Commission’s assessment, the ECOFIN Council delivers its 
opinion, which opinion may give rise to a member state receiving an early warning.   
 
It is worth noting that, prior to the recent crisis, the instruments available under the 
preventive arm were used sparingly. According to the European Commission’s website, 
the Commission has recommended that the Council address an early warning to a euro 
zone member on only four occasions since 2002 (Portugal and Germany in January 2002, 
                                                 
8 This instrument was introduced in the reform of the SGP in 2005 
France in November 2002 and Italy in April 2004) and on only one of these occasions 
(the French case of 2002-03) did the Council follow up with an early warning. The policy 
advice instrument was not used at all before 2008. 
 
 - The Brussels-Dublin controversy of 2001 
 
Ireland fell foul of the EU surveillance process in 2001. The BEPG promulgated in June 
2000 suggested that member states speed up fiscal consolidation by, inter alia, ‘taking 
advantage of any additional room for manoeuvre in achieving better-than-expected 
budgetary positions’. Ireland was specifically enjoined to ensure that budgetary policy 
avoid overheating of the economy and to restrain the growth in public consumption in the 
light of the exceptional rates of economic growth being recorded. 
 
In December of that year, Charlie McCreevy presented his budget for 2001. That budget 
provided for net tax cuts amounting to the equivalent of 1.4% of GDP, an increase of 
11.6% nominal in gross current spending9, and a general government surplus of 4.3% of 
GDP, down from 4.7% of GDP in 2000. As already noted, this implied the intention to 
reduce the cyclically adjusted surplus by 0.7% of GDP between the two years. At the 
same time the Department of Finance was forecasting real GDP growth of 8.8% in 2001, 
well above even the most sanguine estimates of the economy’s potential growth rate.  
 
Also published with the budget was the Stability Programme Update. This envisaged real 
GDP growth averaging 6% in 2002 and 2003, budget surpluses of 3.8% and 4.6% of 
GDP respectively in those years and a decline in the debt/GDP ratio to 24% by end-2003 
from 39% at end-2000.  
 
The Commission’s assessment of the 2001 budget found that it was expansionary and 
pro-cyclical10. Guided by this assessment, in February 2001 the ECOFIN Council opined 
that the budget and the associated Stability Programme Update were inconsistent with the 
BEPG and recommended that the government resolve the matter by adopting 
‘countervailing budgetary measures’ during the year.  
 
The Commission’s assessment and the Council’s recommendation were coolly received 
in Ireland, not only by the government but also by many politically independent 
commentators11. No ‘countervailing budgetary measures’ were adopted and in a 
subsequent review, carried out in November 2001, the Council appeared to retract its 
earlier injunction when it stated that ‘unexpected economic developments were such that 
the inconsistency underlying the recommendation had lost its force’. What had happened 
between the time of the original recommendation and the review was that an international 
                                                 
9 The current spending aggregate the growth of which the government had committed itself to restrain to an 
average annual rate of 4% nominal for the duration of its term of office was targeted to increase by 9% in 
2001, which would have brought the annual average growth rate in this aggregate for the 1997-2001 period 
to 6.3%. In his budget speech of December 2000, the Minister for Finance announced that: ‘The 
Government decided that an increase beyond the 4% limit was justified in order to make more rapid 
progress in key social spending areas, and to help secure industrial peace’.    
10 See European Commission (2001) 
11 There were exceptions, amongst them Barry and FitzGerald (2001) 
economic slowdown had gathered force and the pace of economic activity in Ireland had 
slowed sharply. Between the first and fourth quarters of 2001, the year-on-year increase 
in real GDP in Ireland decelerated from 13.1% to 0.1%. 
 
- EU surveillance outcomes 2002-07 
 
After the 2001 controversy, there was no further formal censure of Irish fiscal policy by 
the competent EU authorities. At no stage between 2002 and 2007 were either the early 
warning or policy advice instruments invoked in the Irish case.  
 
This is not to say that there were no critical observations made in relation to the 
management of Ireland’s public finances by the Commission or the Council over this 
period. There were. For example, concerns were expressed about the budget deficits 
projected in the Stability Programme Updates of 2002 and 2003, the Irish practice of 
resorting to large contingency provisions in medium-term budgetary projections drew 
disapproving comment on the grounds that it displayed a less than desirable degree of 
specificity, and frustration was expressed at Ireland’s slow progress in introducing a 
medium-term fiscal framework.  
 
On the other hand, the dominant message was one of satisfaction that Ireland was 
adhering to the Stability and Growth Pact, and a reasonable reading of the succession of 
Commission assessments and Council opinions published on Ireland between 2002 and 
2007 is that their tone became less critical and more approving over time. A remark that 
is not atypical of the latter part of this period is the following, contained in the concluding 
paragraph of the Commission’s assessment of Ireland’s Stability Programme Update of 
2005-07 and reiterated in the Councils’ opinion of same: ‘…the fiscal position can be 
considered as sound and the budgetary strategy provides a good example of fiscal 
policies conducted in compliance with the Pact’12. A similar verdict was delivered by the 
Council in relation to Ireland’s Stability Programme Update of 2006-09.   
 
Of course, the Commission’s assessments (and the Council’s opinions) published in this 
period, and especially the latter part of the period, contain references to downside 
macroeconomic risks to the public finance position. Amongst the risks referred to are 
those associated with Ireland’s sensitivity to the international economic climate and with 
a sharp downturn in the property/construction sector.  Still, the strong impression 
conveyed by the relevant texts is that such risks were comfortably manageable. For 
example, the Commission’s assessment of the 2005-07 Stability Programme Update 
noted the downside risks mentioned above, but went on to judge that the overall risks to 
the budgetary projections contained therein ‘seem to be on the positive side, in particular 
in 2006’13.  
 
By way of further example in the same vein, it is worth noting that the Council opinion 
on the 2006-09 Stability Programme Update, published in February 2007, while noting 
                                                 
12 Official Journal of the European Union, C 82/19 5th March 2006 
13 See European Commission (2006) 
that ‘a sharp downturn in high levels of residential construction and property prices are 
important risks’, went on to say: 
 
“The risks in the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. On 
the one hand, the macroeconomic situation, after a probably stronger than assumed 
starting position, could evolve less favourably than projected, and, associated with this, 
specific revenue sources, particularly those most closely linked to the housing market, 
could also be significantly weaker. On the other hand, other revenues taken together 
appear to have been projected cautiously, and in recent years expenditures have been 
contained within or close to planned levels.”14   
 
Table 4 summarises the outcome of the ECOFIN council’s examinations of Ireland’s last 
three Stability Programme Updates before the onset of the crisis, under a number of 
headings. Some of these headings are self-explanatory; some not. The safety margin 
question relates to whether there was judged to be a sufficient margin relative to the 3% 
of GDP deficit limit throughout the projection period. The long-term sustainability risk 
relates to how vulnerable to the long-term implications of ageing the public finances are 
judged to be. A quick perusal of the table indicates that none of the assessments would 
have signalled grounds for acute concern about the Irish situation. 
 
 
5. Policy surveillance: the IMF 
 
The economic and financial policies of all IMF member countries are subject to IMF 
surveillance, a process that involves policy monitoring and advice. A key part of that 
surveillance process is the regular (typically annual) round of consultations by IMF staff 
with government, central bank officials and other organisations in individual member 
countries. These consultations take place under Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of 
Association.  
 
Following these Article IV consultations by the IMF staff mission to the country in 
question, a staff report is prepared and presented for discussion to the Fund’s Executive 
Board. A summary of the Board’s views is then sent to the relevant government 
concerned. Subsequently, and with the consent of the government concerned, a summary 
of the Board’s assessment, together with the staff report upon which that assessment is 
based, are published.  
 
In the case of Ireland, the IMF carried out Article IV consultations in each of the years 
2001 through 2007, and all the corresponding staff reports and Board assessments for the 
period have been published. The ambit of the IMF documents extends well beyond fiscal 
policy to include macroeconomic trends, international competitiveness, the state of the 
property market, the condition of the banking industry and the financial system more 
generally and more besides. In what follows, we focus mainly on the IMF’s appraisal of 
fiscal policy, and confine our attention to the successive Executive Board assessments 
and to the paragraphs of the successive staff reports setting out the overall staff appraisal.  
                                                 
14 Official Journal of the European Union C70/1 27th March 2007 
 
A concern repeatedly raised by the IMF was the inappropriately pro-cyclical fiscal stance. 
This criticism was explicitly made in 2001 (echoing ECOFIN), 2002, 2005 and in 2007. 
Interestingly, while the staff report made the case for a neutral fiscal stance in 2001, the 
view was taken at the time of publication (August of that year) that a mid-year 
adjustment was not warranted because of the economic slowdown that had occurred since 
the budget was announced. It is also interesting to note that the 2007 Executive Board 
assessment suggested a less than unanimous view that the pro-cyclical stimulus planned 
for that year was undesirable15. Here there are echoes of the disagreement revealed in the 
previous year’s publication, when a number of Board members demurred from the 
majority recommendation that some fiscal tightening be undertaken in 200716. 
 
Another recurring theme is the need to restrain spending. In fact, every year from 2001 
through 2007 the IMF recommended, in one form or another, that spending growth be 
limited. In the early years of this period, the recommendation sprung from a concern that 
the benchmarking process would greatly increase public sector pay bill, necessitating, in 
the IMF’s view, offsetting measures elsewhere. In the later years, the recommendation 
took the form of an injunction to cap the growth of current spending at or below the 
growth rate of nominal GDP. Throughout, the judgement that the actual growth of 
spending was excessive has to be inferred and was never made explicit. 
 
Yet another theme that recurs is the desirability of expanding the tax base. In 2002 the 
IMF suggested that it might be necessary for the government to find new sources of 
revenue and in 2004, and again in 2005 and 2006, it recommended that the tax base be 
widened through one or other of: (i) the introduction of a property tax; (ii) the 
curtailment/elimination of mortgage interest relief, and/or (iii) the phasing out of other 
remaining property-related tax incentives. At the same time, the IMF was clearly 
supportive of the broad thrust of government policy in relation to taxes on labour. In 2001 
it welcomed the cuts in tax rates and the broadening of the rate bands implemented in that 
year’s budget, and in subsequent reports commended the low labour tax wedge that 
obtained in Ireland. At no stage did the IMF betray concern about the narrowing of the 
income tax base that the budgets of the 2001-2007 period brought about. 
 
In the earlier discussion of fiscal policy, it was suggested that the overarching error made 
during the boom was the failure to anticipate that the huge surge in property- and 
construction-related tax revenues would be reversed. Was the IMF cognisant of the 
transitory nature of such receipts, and what did it suggest by way of policy response? As 
early as 2004, the Executive Board assessment noted that stronger than expected tax 
receipts were due in part to buoyancy of the property market and urged that political 
pressure to spend the windfall be resisted. The same recommendation was repeated in 
                                                 
15 The relevant excerpt from the document is: ‘Many Directors, however, saw the planned reduction in the 
fiscal surplus as an undesirable pro-cyclical fiscal stimulus, while acknowledging Ireland’s pressing need to 
increase infrastructure and social spending.’ See IMF (2007).  
16 The relevant excerpt is: ‘…most Directors considered that a modest fiscal tightening would be desirable 
in 2007, given the strength of domestic demand, potential risks of a hard landing, and the need to prepare 
for population ageing…A number of Directors, however, saw less merit in fiscal tightening at the current 
juncture, pointing for the need for further increases in spending to achieve social goals.’ See IMF (2006). 
2005, but curiously not in 2006. In 2007, a slightly different but related point was made 
in the staff report which noted that some weakening of the fiscal position was likely on 
the basis of unchanged policies in 2008 because of a cooling property market.  
 
However, while the IMF identified the issue of transitory tax receipts, there is nothing in 
the Executive Board assessments or the staff reports to indicate an appreciation of quite 
how big a problem this would become. The 2007 staff report seemed to suggest that it 
could be insured against by a combination of limiting the increase in current spending to 
the growth rate in nominal GDP and refraining from tax cuts17, a policy prescription that 
now seems remarkably timid. 
 
In summary, IMF surveillance during the period under review did identify the principal 
vulnerabilities of the Irish public finances that have since been revealed to such 
devastating effect, but in discussing them, conveyed the impression that they were of 
second order importance. Such an impression would have been greatly reinforced by a 
feature common to IMF reports on Ireland during this period, namely the repeated 
description of macroeconomic policies as ‘sound’ and/or of fiscal policy as ‘prudent’.  
 
Every year between 2002 and 2007, the opening paragraph of the Executive Board 
assessment lavished plaudits on Ireland’s policy-makers. There is more than a hint of 
Ireland as poster child about some of these. In 2004, for example, the IMF had this to say: 
 
 ‘Executive Directors commended the continued impressive performance of Ireland’s 
economy, which is based on sound economic policies, providing useful lessons for other 
countries.’  
 
By 2005, the Executive Directors’ commendation was explicitly extended to include 
‘prudent’ fiscal policy, and this was repeated in 2006 and 200718. Nor was the laudatory 
tone confined to what might be regarded as the more politicised text published by the 
Executive Board19. Almost identical sentiments were expressed in the staff reports.  
 
 
6. Surveillance by the OECD 
 
Like the IMF, the OECD plays a role in the monitoring of policy and the provision of 
policy advice. Its reports range across a broader canvass than those of the IMF however 
and, at least in the case of smaller economies like Ireland, tend to be rather less frequent. 
In the 2001-2007 period, the OECD published just three Economic Surveys of Ireland: in 
2001, 2003 and 2006. In what follows, we confine our remarks to the 2006 Survey, on the 
                                                 
17 ‘In 2008, on unchanged policies, some weakening of the fiscal position due to the cooling housing 
market is likely. Given the uncertainty about the size of the decline in revenue from the cooling housing 
market, this is the time to preserve a strong underlying fiscal position by restraining current spending 
increases to nominal GDP growth and avoiding tax cuts.’ See IMF (2007). 
18 The 2006 assessment, for example, begins with: ‘The Executive Directors commended Ireland’s 
continued impressive economic performance, which has been supported by sound policies, including 
prudent fiscal policy, low taxes on labour and business income, and labour market flexibility.’ IMF (2006) 
19 The Executive Board comprises 24 directors who are appointed or elected by member countries. 
grounds that the 2001 Survey was too early in the period we are reviewing to be hugely 
significant in its own right and the 2003 Survey did not feature fiscal policy as a major 
theme. 
 
The 2006 Survey had quite a deal to say about fiscal policy and was, at one level at least, 
remarkably prescient. It was critical of the government’s plan (per the Stability 
Programme Update published in December 2005) to run deficits in each of the years 
2006 through 2008, on the familiar grounds of providing inappropriately pro-cyclical 
stimulus. More tellingly, it warned that sizeable spending commitments were being 
locked in at what could be the peak of the revenue cycle. It also warned that even a soft 
landing for the housing market would sharply weaken government receipts and result in a 
‘substantial structural budget deterioration’ on top of any cyclical weakening. 
 
The OECD’s policy advice however, betrayed a failure to come close to appreciating the 
size of the risks about which it was warning. It concluded its analysis by saying:  
 
‘For all these reasons, a prudent approach…would be to leave sufficient room for 
manoeuvre…In practice this means returning to (budget) balance or running a small 
surplus’.20 
 
This was published in March 2006, against the background of a target budget deficit of 
0.6% of GDP for that year and projected deficits of 0.8% of GDP for 2007 and 2008. By 
the end of the year a large budget surplus amounting to 2.9% of GDP had emerged for 
2006 and the government was projecting surpluses for each of the years 2007 through 
2009 in its December 2006 Stability Programme Update. Had the Survey been published 
nine months later than it was, would these changes in the fiscal arithmetic have 
convinced its authors that sufficient room for manoeuvre had been created? 
 
 
7. Deficiencies of surveillance 
 
To varying degrees, the external agencies that carry out policy surveillance identified the 
main vulnerabilities that developed in Ireland’s public finances during the boom years. 
However, those vulnerabilities were not afforded anything like the prominence, nor was 
the need to address them invested with anything like the urgency that subsequent events 
indicate was warranted. Indeed, a reasonable reading of international assessments 
published between 2001 and 2007 is that the vulnerabilities and risks that characterised 
the public finances were matters of second-order importance by comparison with the 
perceived prudence and soundness of the overall fiscal stance. 
 
It may be speculated that part of the reason for this was a kind of cognitive bias that 
distorted international agencies’ perceptions of what was going on in an economy that 
had come to be regarded by them as a model of success. What is certain is that what 
muted warnings were issued were marked by a form of ‘disaster myopia’, a consistent 
                                                 
20 OECD (2006) 
tendency to hugely underestimate the downside. This cognitive error is rooted in part in 
serious methodological deficiencies to which we now turn. 
 
At the peak of the property and construction boom, in 2006, the Irish government posted 
a budget surplus of 2.9% of GDP. To what extent was this apparently healthy budgetary 
position exaggerated by the prevailing condition of the economy? The answer to this 
question is crucial to assessing the soundness of the fiscal policy stance. Economists 
attempt to answer it by estimating the cyclical component of the budget balance, in other 
words, by estimating the degree to which the actual budget surplus was boosted by  
transitory factors. Such estimates vary, depending on the precise methodology used and 
on the point in time at which the analysis is conducted.  
 
What we’re interested in here, in the first instance, are the answers provided, not with the 
benefit of hindsight and subsequent methodological innovation, but in real time (or as 
close to real time as is practicable, given reporting lags) by the analytical techniques used 
by international surveillance agencies. Given what we now understand to have happened, 
the answers are arresting. In 2007, each of the agencies whose surveillance records we 
are reviewing, estimated that Ireland’s structural or cyclically-adjusted budget was in 
surplus to the tune of 2.5-3% of GDP in 2006, implying that the actual surplus recorded 
that year had been boosted to a trivial extent by cyclical factors.  
 
It is worth examining the corresponding data for each of the years 2000 through 2007 
(see Table 5). What we have done in each case is reproduce the first estimates published 
by the respective agencies after the end of the year in question. Thus, the EC estimate for 
2000 is that published in the Public Finances in EMU report for 2001, the EC estimate 
for 2001 is that published in the 2002 Public Finances in EMU report, and so on. In 
respect of any given year, there are differences in estimates across agencies, but these 
differences are of minor importance when set against the broadly similar story told by the 
series of estimates constructed by each agency.  
 
There was agreement across the three agencies that the Irish government ran a large 
structural budget surplus in 2000, followed by a small structural deficit in 2001 and a 
rather larger deficit in 2002. There was some disagreement in respect of 2003, but all pre-
crisis estimates suggested that the Irish government was running substantial structural 
surpluses in each of the years 2004 through 2006 and a rather smaller surplus in 2007.  
 
Judged with reference to these estimates, Irish fiscal policy appears to have been sound in 
the years immediately preceding the crisis. Viewed from an EU perspective, such 
estimates suggested that Ireland, which was so clearly observing the letter of the Stability 
and Growth Pact by operating comfortably within the Pact’s explicit numerical 
parameters, was also observing the spirit of the Pact which calls for budgets to be kept 
close to balance or in surplus in the medium term. 
 
The methodology used by all three international agencies to identify the cyclical 
component of budget balances is essentially of the ‘gaps and elasticities’ variety. As such 
it incorporates two components: (i) an estimate of the margin by which output (GDP) in a 
given year exceeds or falls short of its ‘potential’ level, and (ii) a set of elasticity 
estimates that reflect the sensitivity of elements of the budget – principally taxes - to 
variations in output. In general, both components are susceptible to considerable error. In 
the case of Ireland in the 2001-2007 period, and especially towards the end of that period, 
it is now evident that contemporaneous estimates of the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance were very seriously impaired on both counts. 
 
- Tax elasticities 
 
The estimates of tax elasticities used by the European Commission and the OECD in 
computing the cyclical adjusted budget balance for Ireland are set out in Table 6. Four 
different categories of receipts are separately identified: personal tax; corporate tax; 
social contributions and indirect taxes. Receipts from capital taxes are allocated between 
the personal and corporate categories. Stamp duties are treated as an indirect tax.  
 
Average tax elasticities for Ireland for the 2007-09 period are set out in Table 7. These 
are not comparable with the EC/OECD estimates on a category-by-category basis, 
because of classification differences. Nor are the aggregate figures strictly comparable, 
because the EC/OECD estimate is ex ante while the actual estimate is ex post and, as 
such, incorporates the effects of changes in tax rates. Still, a comparison of the two sets 
of figures is instructive. 
 
The ex post tax elasticity over this period is 1.83, markedly higher than the estimate of 
1.14 incorporated in EC/OECD calculations of the CAB. Ex ante, the tax elasticity for 
this period would have been materially higher again reflecting the fact that tax rates, 
especially social contribution rates, were raised sharply in response to the fiscal crisis. 
(Excluding social contributions, the ex post tax elasticity for 2007-09 is 2.2.)  
 
So, EC/OECD tax elasticity estimates seriously underestimated the sensitivity of Irish tax 
receipts to changes in GDP, perhaps by a factor of one-half21, and their incorporation in 
estimates of Ireland’s CAB correspondingly boosted such estimates and exaggerated the 
underlying health of the public finances during the boom. This is not an issue of unique 
relevance to Ireland, or course. There is a considerable empirical literature on the 
unreliability of official tax elasticity measures for a wide range of countries, dating back 
to the early years of this decade, much of it generated by economists working for the 
agencies engaged in international fiscal surveillance22. 
 
- The output gap 
 
Estimates of the Irish output gap for the years 2000 through 2007 are set out in Table 8. 
These are assembled on the same basis as the CAB estimates of Table 5. Again, there are 
differences across agencies on a year-by-year basis, but again the story told by each 
                                                 
21 For every 1% fall in GDP, the EC/OECD estimates suggest a 1.1% decline in tax receipts, but the actual 
behaviour of tax receipts between 2007 and 2009 indicates a 2.2% fall in receipts for every 1% fall in GDP.   
22 See, for example, Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002), Girouard and Price (2004), Jaeger and Schuknecht 
(2004) and Martinez-Mongay et al (2007). 
series over time is broadly similar. The Irish economy was perceived to be operating well 
above its potential output level in the early part of the decade by all three agencies, but to 
be at or close to potential in the latter part of the period.  
 
How could an economy experiencing a large and unsustainable building boom be 
represented as operating at or close to its potential output level or, in other words, in the 
vicinity of its medium-term sustainable level of output? The answer, of course, resides in 
the methodology. The traditional methodology estimates potential output in the basis of a 
production function that does not distinguish between different sectors of the economy. 
As such, it is susceptible to serious biases in circumstances where an economy is 
experiencing major structural change, even more so when that structural change is being 
driven by something like a building boom.  
 
In the case of Ireland in the 2001-2007 period, the application of the traditional 
methodology meant that the slower average growth rate of the period was being 
represented as a reflection of an economy in which actual growth had dropped below 
potential  – hence the gradual elimination of the estimated output gap. In contrast, what 
was actually happening was that, because of the rapid growth of the 1990s and the 
resultant decrease in spare capacity, the economy’s potential growth rate had declined. 
Meanwhile the output growth that was taking place was increasingly accounted for by the 
construction sector.  
 
Recent work by the IMF, based on a more refined approach than the traditional 
methodology, paints a radically different picture of the evolution of Ireland’s potential 
output during the boom23. As a result, the IMF now estimates a positive output gap in 
2007 amounting to the equivalent of 7.1% of GDP. Parallel work carried out at the 
OECD has yielded broadly similar results. The result is that the latest surveillance reports 
on Ireland from these agencies contain sharply revised estimates of the CAB or structural 
budget balance in the years immediately prior to the crisis. The new IMF estimates, for 
example, show structural budget deficits of 5.4%, 5.7% and 8.7% of GDP in 2005, 2006 
and 2007 respectively, in place of the structural budget surpluses previously estimated for 
these years24.    
 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
Throughout the boom years, Ireland’s principal fiscal ratios behaved impressively: a 
budget surplus was recorded in every year but one between 2001 and 2007 and the 
debt/GDP ratio had fallen to 25% by the end of this period. These high-level ratios 
obscured a dangerous and growing structural imbalance however. A property bubble and 
associated construction boom generated a large but transitory surge in tax revenues, the 
reversal of which was not anticipated by fiscal policy. Instead, the government used the 
windfall to ramp up recurring expenditures and to narrow the tax base. When tax 
revenues evaporated in the face of a very deep construction-led recession, Ireland 
                                                 
23 See Athanasopolou (2009) 
24 See IMF (2009) 
experienced quite the sharpest fiscal deterioration of any EU member. Between 2007 and 
2009, the budget balance shifted from small surplus to a deficit of 14.3% of GDP while 
the gross debt/GDP ratio rose to 64%. 
 
To varying degrees, the external surveillance agencies identified the main vulnerabilities 
that developed in Ireland’s public finances during the boom years. However, those 
vulnerabilities were not afforded anything like the prominence, nor was the need to 
address them invested with anything like the urgency that subsequent events indicate was 
warranted. Indeed, a reasonable reading of international assessments of the Irish economy 
published between 2001 and 2007 is that the risks that characterised the public finances 
were matters of second-order importance by comparison with the perceived prudence and 
soundness of the overall fiscal stance. 
 
One reason for the failure of surveillance is methodological. There was a systematic 
overestimation of Ireland’s potential output during the years prior to the crisis and, by the 
same token, a systematic underestimation of the extent to which economic activity was 
boosted by unsustainable factors. Moreover, the estimates of tax elasticities used in the 
agencies’ models greatly understated the sensitivity of Irish tax receipts to a given fall in 
output. The net result of all this was that the government budget was unanimously 
represented as being in substantial structural surplus at the height of the construction 
boom, whereas it is now clear in hindsight that it was in deep structural deficit. 
 
The failure of surveillance cannot be entirely ascribed to methodological shortcomings 
however. To do so would be to impute more faith in the standard methodology on the 
part of the surveillance agencies than the evidence warrants. As early as 2003, for 
example, both the European Commission and the OECD were warning about the frailties 
of output gap estimates for Ireland and the risks attached to using them to assess the 
stance of fiscal policy25. Also, as noted earlier, economists in each of these organisations, 
and in the IMF, had been drawing attention to the particular sensitivity of tax revenues to 
asset price movements and the risk that ignoring this phenomenon (a deficiency of the 
standard methodology) poses for budgetary analysis in a series of papers dating back to 
2002.  
 
Moreover, it is scarcely conceivable that the European Commission, the IMF and the 
OECD, in their consultations with Irish officials, would not have been made aware of the 
very strong reservations harboured by the Department of Finance about the standard 
methodology used to cyclically adjust the Irish budget balance, reservations that were 
repeatedly expressed in the annual Stability Programme Updates published by the Irish 
government.  
 
What the evidence suggests therefore is that international surveillance agencies persisted 
with the application to Ireland of a methodology that they had reason to believe was not 
                                                 
25 The European Commission (2003) opined that ‘calculations of the output gap are subject to a particularly 
large margin of error in Ireland’. The OECD (2003) stressed that in the Irish case potential output is 
difficult to estimate and warned on that account that care should be exercised in drawing conclusions about 
the stance of fiscal policy. 
fit for purpose. No doubt considerations of efficiency played a part here: from the point 
of view of an organisation involved in the surveillance of a large number of economies, it 
makes more sense to use a framework that can be applied uniformly across countries than 
to design bespoke techniques for individual countries, including very small ones.  
 
The same principle need not apply to verbal commentary of course. There was ample 
opportunity for published reports to enter strong caveats about the formal analysis and 
escalate concern about growing economic and fiscal imbalances through the use of 
language, but this was not done. The overall tone remained positive, if not laudatory26. 
 
Cognitive bias may also have been a factor. There is more than a hint of Ireland as ‘poster 
child’ in some of the assessments. Thus, to the European Commission and the ECOFIN 
Council, Ireland’s budgetary strategy provided ‘a good example of fiscal policies in 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact’. To the IMF, the impressive performance 
of the Irish economy provided ‘useful lessons for other countries’. It may have become 
difficult for agencies accustomed to regarding Ireland as a model of success to fully 
recognise the frailties of that model. 
 
Jim O’Leary 
NUI-Maynooth 
June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Preliminary content analysis of IMF reports on Ireland between 2001 and 2007, using content analysis 
software, suggest no significant change in tone over this period and not much difference in tone from those 
published for other euro zone economies. (Golubovskaja (2010)) 
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